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1 Introduction
Weighted voting games are a fundamental model in cooperative game theory, used to formalize collective
decision making processes. A weighted voting game is given by a set of n positively-weighted agents, and
a positive quota value, also known as the threshold. A set of agents (a coalition) is said to be winning if
their combined weight exceeds the prescribed quota. This setting was inspired by parliamentary systems.
Indeed, when forming a coalition following an election, or when legislating a law, there is a minimal threshold
(e.g., the minimal number of parliament seats needed to form a coalition, or the necessary amount of votes
required to pass a bill), which requires the agents to cooperate. Due to its direct relevance to such political
bodies, much work has been done on modelling real-life parliamentary systems as weighted voting games, and
studying their properties from this perspective. Some examples include the European Council of Ministers
(e.g., Leech, 2002a; Algaba et al, 2007; Felsenthal and Machover, 2004), the International Monetary Fund
studied by Leech (Leech, 2002b), and the United Nations Security Council (Strand and Rapkin, 2011).
Furthermore, weighted voting games have also been used to formalize other decision-making processes in
companies, where the votes are cast by the shareholders (e.g., Arcaini and Gambarelli, 1986).
A recurring thread in many of these works is the study of the voting power of agents in these systems.
To that end, a number of measures called “power indices” have been proposed. Informally, a power index
quantifies the amount of influence each agent has in a particular game.
Two well-known examples of such power indices are the Shapley power index (Shapley and Shubik, 1969)1
and the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1964). Both of these power indices build on the notion of a pivotal agent:
an agent is pivotal to a given coalition A, if A is a losing coalition (the combined weight of its agents does
not exceed the quota), and upon joining it, the coalition becomes a winning one. A particular use of these
measures pertains to the design of voting systems, where the goal is usually to reach a certain state of power
distribution, by either assigning the agents their weights, or by judiciously selecting the quota. The goal of
this paper is very much related to the latter approach. That is, we are interested in analyzing the effects of
varying the quota on the resulting Shapley values.
In general though, it is well-known that weighted voting games are hard to reason about. The task
of computing the Shapley values exactly is known to be computationally intractable (Matsui and Matsui,
2001). More importantly, for an arbitrary weighted voting game, the values can exhibit acute fluctuations
with even minute changes to the quota value. Given this fact, we revisit the model by considering the manner
by which the weights are determined. We assume that the weights are the result of an underlying stochastic
process. This additional layer is relevant to many of the settings that our theoretical model applies to. For
example, in the case of a parliamentary system, the number of seats each party depends greatly on the size
of the population that it represents. However, it is often assumed that the sizes of populations are not fixed,
but rather, vary stochastically for various reasons (e.g., Matis and Kiffe, 2000). In accordance with this
added distributional assumption, we revisit the study of Shapley values by considering the expected Shapley
values. More precisely,we ask the following question: Assuming that weights are drawn i.i.d. from a certain
distribution, can we give a closed-form description of the expected Shapley values, as a function of the quota?
In this paper we assume that the agent weights are drawn i.i.d. from an exponentially decaying distribution.
This assumption allows us to provide a strong characterization of the highest and lowest Shapley values. We
accomplish this using a novel connection to renewal theory. To illustrate our general result, we apply it to a
number of well-known distributions. We empirically demonstrate our findings using simulations.
Structure of the paper We outline some of the relevant previous work in Section 2. In Section 3 we provide
the necessary notation, definitions, and some basic properties of the Shapley value. In Section 4, we formally
present our main problem of interest, along with an empirical illustration, based on simulation results for
the case of the uniform distribution on the unit interval. We also present our main result (Theorem 1) in
that section, that pertains to the two extreme agents (those with the highest and lowest weights).
1 The more specific term for our case is the Shapley–Shubik, which pertains to the special case of the Shapley value in
weighted voting games. We use the term Shapley value for succinctness purposes only.
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Before we prove Theorem 1, we first apply it to a number of interesting distributions. We begin with the
case of the uniform distribution in Section 5. This provides a theoretic validation of our empirical results
given in Section 4. We tackle the case of the exponential distribution in Section 6. We then prove Theorem 1
in Section 7, and discuss conjectural extensions in Section 8. Our proof uses a technical result on renewal
processes that may be of independent interest (Proposition 1), which is proved in Section 9. Finally, we
provide concluding remarks and directions for future research in Section 10.
2 Related Work
Ample work has been done on characterizing the power distribution in weighted voting games. The focus of
this paper is the study of the Shapley–Shubik value (Shapley and Shubik, 1969), which is a special case of the
more general Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). For succinctness, we use the term Shapley value for the special
case of weighted voting games as well. Another well-studied measure is the Banzhaf power index (Banzhaf,
1964). See Felsenthal and Machover (1998) for a survey of these power indices.
Shapley values pose a number of difficulties: from a computational perspective, Shapley values have
been shown to be hard to compute; see Chalkiadakis et al (2010) for details. That said, they can easily be
approximated using sampling techniques (e.g., Mann and Shapley, 1962; Bachrach et al, 2010). Moreover,
power indices have been shown to exhibit considerable volatility to changes in the quota, in the absence
of any structural guarantees on the weights (e.g., Zuckerman et al, 2012; Zick, 2013). Zick et al (2011)
demonstrats the effect of changes in the quota to the agents’ Shapley values under a uniform distribution
of agent weights. Recent work by Oren et al (2014) studies similar questions under different probabilistic
models of the weights, and in the case of (fixed) super-increasing weight vectors.
Tauman and Jelnov (2012) consider the case in which the agent weights are drawn i.i.d. from an exponen-
tial distribution. They show that the Shapley value of an agent is proportional to its weight in expectation,
for a wide range of quota values. Their method can potentially be used to analyze other distributions. The
main difference between their work and ours is that they consider the unsorted Shapley values while we
consider the sorted Shapley values. It seems that for technical reasons, their line of reasoning cannot be used
to derive our results.
Finally, there has been a growing body of literature on the so-called inverse Shapley value problem of
selecting the weights vector so as to obtain a resulting vector of desired power indices (e.g., de Keijzer et al,
2010; De et al, 2012; Aziz et al, 2007). This line of work can be thought of as being tangential to our study.
3 Definitions
General notation We use the notation [n] = {1, . . . , n}. A permutation pi is a one-to-one mapping pi : [n]→
[n]. The symmetric group on [n] (the set of all permutations of [n]) is denoted Sn. The notation U(a, b) signifies
the uniform distribution over the interval [a, b]. The notation Exp(λ) signifies the exponential distribution
with density λe−λt and mean 1/λ.
For a random variable Z and a real number t, Z≤t is the distribution of Z conditioned on being at most
t, and Z≥t is the distribution of Z conditioned on being at least t. Given an integer n, we let the random
variable Znmax denote max(Z1, . . . , Zn), where Z1, . . . , Zn are n independent copies of Z; we define Z
n
min
analogously.
Weighted voting games A weighted voting game (WVG) is specified by a set of agents N = [n], with a
corresponding non-decreasing sequence of assigned weights w1, . . . , wn, and a quota q ≥ 0. We think of the
weights as being fixed and of the quota as a parameter. A subset (a coalition) S ⊆ [n] is said to be winning if
w(S) =
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q; otherwise, it is a losing coalition. An agent i ∈ N is said to be pivotal with respect to
a coalition S ⊆ N if S∪{i} is winning, whereas S is not. In other words, i is pivotal if q ∈ (w(S), w(S∪{i})].
The Shapley value (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) of an agent i ∈ N is the probability that, if one selects a
random permutation pi ∈ Sn uniformly at random, agent i would be pivotal with respect to its predecessors
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in the permutation. Formally, the Shapley value of agent i is defined as follows:
ϕi(q) = Pr
pi∈Sn
[wpi(1) + · · ·+ wpi(pi−1(i)−1) < q ≤ wpi(1) + · · ·+ wpi(pi−1(i))]
= Pr
pi∈Sn
[q − wi ≤ wpi(1) + · · ·+ wpi(pi−1(i)−1) < q],
where pi(j) denotes the agent at position j in the permutation pi.
Some elementary properties of the Shapley value include:
– If i ≤ j (and so wi ≤ wj) then ϕi(q) ≤ ϕj(q).
– For 0 ≤ q ≤ w1 + · · ·+ wn we have
∑
i ϕi(q) = 1.
4 Main result and applications
Consider a weighted voting game in which the weights are sampled independently from some “reasonable”
continuous distribution D. We call this the natural iid model. In this paper we analyze the expected largest
and smallest Shapley values in terms of the continuous distribution D, for all values of the quota bounded
away from 0 and nE[D].
Another natural model to consider is very similar: the weights are sampled independently from D, and
then normalized to have unit sum. We call this the normalized iid model. Simulation results show that both
models behave very similarly. We analyze the natural iid model since it is easier to work with.
In order to estimate the Shapley value of the highest-weighted agent n, it is not hard to see that an
answer to the following question would prove instrumental:
Conditioning on them being at most the highest weight wn, let Y1, . . . , Yn−1 ∼ D, and define Sm =∑m
i=1 Yi. What is the expected number of points from {S1, . . . , Sn−1} that lie in the interval [q − wn, q)?
A symmetric question can be phrased for the lowest-weighted agent as well. Put in these terms, we can think
of the process that generates the n − 1 weights (conditioning on the highest weight) as a renewal process.
Roughly speaking, a renewal process (see e.g., Gallager, 1995) is defined by sequential arrivals, where the
gap between every two arrivals (the inter-arrival times) are stochastic. In our case, the inter-arrival times
are given by the agent weights, and the measure in question is the expected number of arrivals within the
specified interval. Our analysis gives a powerful characterization of the Shapley values of both the highest-
and lowest-weighted agents.
Before we begin to analyze the Shapley values, we consider the special case of the uniform distribution,
for which our simulation results (for the normalized iid model) are depicted in Figure 1. Intuitively, we can
see that apart from two relatively short intervals at the two extremes of the interval [0, 1], the Shapley values
are stable at 2/n for the highest Shapley value, and roughly 2/n2 (this estimate will be justified momentarily)
for the lowest Shapley value. From a more practical point of view, this means that as the number of agents
increases, the ratio of the highest to lowest Shapley values grows at a linear rate.
Given the above results, we proceed to a rigorous analysis of the two extreme Shapley values. Let X be
a non-negative continuous random variable whose density function f has exponential decay: f(t) ≤ Ce−λt
for some λ > 0. Note that any bounded continuous random variable trivially has exponential decay, and that
the exponential decay guarantees that X has moments of all orders. Let χmin be the infimal x such that
Pr[X ≥ x] > 0, and let χmax be the supremal x such that Pr[X ≤ x] > 0 (possibly χmax =∞). For example,
the uniform distribution U(a, b) has χmin = a and χmax = b, and the exponential distribution Exp(λ) has
χmin = 0 and χmax =∞.
For technical reasons, we need to make an additional assumption on X: that the support of X can be
partitioned into finitely many intervals, in each of which the density f is differentiable and is monotone
(non-decreasing or non-increading). This assumption is satisfied by our main examples, the uniform and
exponential distributions. We believe that this assumption can be weakened.
Another helpful technical assumption is that x = O(E[X≤x]) for x near χmin, or more formally, for some
C,  > 0 we have x ≤ C E[X≤x] for all x ∈ (χmin, χmin+ ). While it is possible to construct random variables
invalidating this property, all natural random variables do satisfy the property. For example, the property
trivially holds when χmin > 0, and if χmin = 0, then it holds when f(x) = O(x
δ) near zero for any δ > 0,
and in particular when f is real analytic near zero. In our applications we verify this property explicitly.
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Fig. 1 Shapley values for X = U(0, 1) and n = 10, 20 of both minimal and maximal agents, multiplied by n, for the normalized
iid model. Results of 106 experiments.
Consider the following random process for generating weights (the natural iid model): sample x1, . . . , xn
from X independently. We define the weights w1, . . . , wn to be the sequence obtained from x1, . . . , xn by
sorting them in non-decreasing order, i.e., w1 is the smallest weight and wn is the largest weight.
The following is our main theorem. We defer its proof to Section 7 in favor of discussing a couple of its
implications.
Theorem 1 Let X be a non-negative continuous random variable whose density function f satisfies f(t) ≤
Ce−λt for some C, λ > 0, and additionally, the support of f can be partitioned into finitely many intervals
on which f is differentiable and monotone, and that x = O(EX≤x[X]) for x near χmin.
For all  > 0 there exists ξ < 1 such that the following holds. For all Q ∈ [n1/4, (1− )E[X]],
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmax
[ x
E[X≤x]
]±O(ξn1/4).
Similarly, for all Q ∈ [n1/4, (n− n2/3)E[X]],
E[ϕ[x]min(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmin
[ x
E[X≥x]
]±O(ξn1/4).
In particular, we can determine the limiting values of nE[ϕn(Q)] and nE[ϕ1(Q)].
Corollary 1 Let X be a random variable satisfying the requirements of Theorem 1. Suppose that q ∈ (0, 1)
and (for the first statement) χmax <∞, where χmax = sup{x : Pr[X ≤ x] > 0}. Then for Q = qnE[X],
lim
n→∞nE[ϕn(Q)] =
χmax
E[X]
,
lim
n→∞nE[ϕ1(Q)] =
χmin
E[X]
.
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If χmax =∞ then as n→∞ we have nE[ϕn(qnE[X])]→∞ and
nE[ϕn(Q)] ∼ E
x∼Xnmax
[
x
E[X≤x]
].
Proof Let Q = qnE[X]. We start by proving the result for ϕ1. For large enough n, it is the case that
Q ∈ [n1/4, (n− n2/3)E[X]], and so we can apply the theorem to obtain
E[ϕ[x]min(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmin
[ x
E[X≥x]
]±O(ξn1/4).
As n→∞, the random variable Xnmin tends to the constant χmin, and so since x/E[X≥x] is continuous, this
implies the formula for ϕ1.
The proof for ϕn is similar but has an extra complication. Suppose first that χmax < ∞. Take m large
enough so that E[X≤m] > q E[X]. For large enough n, it is the case that Q ∈ [n1/4, (n− n2/3)E[X≤m]], and
so we can apply the theorem to obtain
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmax
[ x
E[X≤x]
]±O(ξn1/4).
As before, the random variable Xnmax tends to the constant distribution χmax, and this implies the formula
for ϕn.
Finally, suppose that χmax =∞. For the same choice of m and for large enough n, the theorem implies
that
nE[ϕn(Q)] = E
x∼Xnmax
[
x
E[X≤x]
]± o(1).
In order to finish the proof, it remains to show that the expectation on the right tends to infinity. Indeed,
this expectation is at least E[Xnmax]/E[X], and it is not hard to check that E[Xnmax]→∞.
5 The Uniform Distribution
Given the general result given in Theorem 1, we now demonstrate one application of it on the uniform
distribution U(a, b) , where 0 ≤ a < b. It is easy to see that χmin = a and χmax = b in this case. When
X = U(a, b), Corollary 1 shows that for q ∈ (0, 1), nϕn(qnE[X])→ 2b/(a+b) and nϕ1(qnE[X])→ 2a/(a+b).
Theorem 1 implies the following more precise statement, illustrated by Figure 1 for the case X = U(0, 1):
Theorem 2 Let X = U(a, b), where 0 ≤ a < b. For all  > 0 there exist ψ < 1 and K > 0 such that the
following hold:
– For all q ∈ [n−3/4, 1− ],
E[ϕn(qnE[X])] =
1
b− a
∫ b
a
(
t− a
b− a
)n−1
2t
a+ t
dt±O(ψn1/4).
We can evaluate the integral as a series:
1
b− a
∫ b
a
(
t− a
b− a
)n−1
2t
a+ t
dt =
2b
a+ b
1
n
− 2a
a+ b
∞∑
d=1
(
b− a
a+ b
)d
d!
n(n+ 1) · · · (n+ d) .
In particular, when a = 0 the integral is equal to 2n .
– For all q ∈ [n−3/4, 1−Kn−1/3],
E[ϕ1(qnE[X])] =
1
b− a
∫ b
a
(
b− t
b− a
)n−1
2t
b+ t
dt±O(ψn1/4).
We can evaluate the integral as a series:
1
b− a
∫ b
a
(
b− t
b− a
)n−1
2t
b+ t
dt =
2a
a+ b
1
n
− 2b
a+ b
∞∑
d=1
(
a− b
a+ b
)d
d!
n(n+ 1) · · · (n+ d) .
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In particular, when a = 0 the integral is equal to
2
∞∑
d=1
(−1)d+1d!
n(n+ 1) · · · (n+ d) =
2
n(n+ 1)
− 4
n(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
+ · · · .
Proof If a = 0 then E[X≤x] = x/2 and so x = O(E[X≤x]) for all x ∈ [a, b]. If a > 0 then for x ≥ a we trivially
have E[X≤x] ≥ a and so x = O(E[X≤x]) again for all x ∈ [a, b]. In both cases we see that Theorem 1 applies.
We have χmin = a, χmax = b, E[X] = (a+ b)/2, E[X≤x] = (a+ x)/2 and E[X≥x] = (b+ x)/2.
The distribution of Xnmax is given by
Pr[Xnmax ≤ t] = Pr[X ≤ t]n =
(
t− a
b− a
)n
.
The corresponding density function is the derivative nb−a
(
t−a
b−a
)n−1
. The formula for ϕn(qnE[X]) follows
from
E
x∼Xnmax
[
x
E[X≤x]
] = E
x∼Xnmax
[
2x
a+ x
] =
1
b− a
∫ b
a
n
(
t− a
b− a
)n−1
2t
a+ t
dt.
Similarly, the distribution of Xnmin is given by
Pr[Xnmin ≥ t] = Pr[X ≥ t]n =
(
b− t
b− a
)n
.
The corresponding density function is the negated derivative nb−a
(
b−t
b−a
)n−1
. The formula for ϕ1(qnE[X])
follows from
E
x∼Xnmin
[
x
E[X≥x]
] = E
x∼Xnmin
[
2x
b+ x
] =
1
b− a
∫ b
a
n
(
b− t
b− a
)n−1
2t
b+ t
dt.
We proceed to evaluate the integrals, starting with the first one. The basic observation is
1
b− a
∫ b
a
(
t− a
b− a
)n−1(
b− t
b− a
)d
dt =
∫ 1
0
sn−1(1− s)d dt = d!
n(n+ 1) · · · (n+ d) , (1)
using the substitution s = (t− a)/(b− a) and the Beta integral. A simple calculation shows that
t
a+ t
=
b
a+ b
− a
a+ b
∞∑
d=1
(
b− t
a+ b
)d
.
Therefore, using (1),
1
b− a
∫ b
a
(
t− a
b− a
)n−1
2t
a+ t
dt =
2
b− a
∫ b
a
(
t− a
b− a
)n−1 [
b
a+ b
− a
a+ b
∞∑
d=1
(
b− t
a+ b
)d]
dt
=
2b
a+ b
1
n
− 2a
a+ b
∞∑
d=1
(
b− a
a+ b
)d
d!
n(n+ 1) · · · (n+ d) .
The second integral can be evaluated in the same way. Alternatively, substitute (a, b) = (b, a) in the
formula for the first integral to obtain
1
b− a
∫ b
a
(
b− t
b− a
)n−1
2t
b+ t
dt =
1
a− b
∫ a
b
(
t− b
a− b
)n−1
2t
b+ t
dt
=
2a
a+ b
1
n
− 2b
a+ b
∞∑
d=1
(
a− b
a+ b
)d
d!
n(n+ 1) · · · (n+ d) .
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6 The Exponential Distribution
In this section we analyze the exponential distribution X = Exp(1), whose bounds are χmin = 0 and
χmax =∞. Corollary 1 shows that nϕ1(qnE[X])→ 0 for all q ∈ (0, 1) and implies that nϕn(qnE[X])→∞.
Theorem 1 implies the following more precise statement, illustrated by Figure 2:
Theorem 3 Let X = Exp(1). For all  > 0 there exist ψ < 1 and K > 0 such that the following hold:
– For all q ∈ [n−3/4, 1− ],
E[ϕn(qnE[X])] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− e−x)n x
ex − (1 + x) dx+O(ψ
n1/4),
and the integral satisfies∫ ∞
0
(1− e−x)n x
ex − (1 + x) dx =
log n+ γ
n
+O
(
log2 n
n2
)
.
– For all q ∈ [n−3/4, 1−Kn−1/3],
E[ϕ1(qnE[X])] =
∫ ∞
0
e−nx
x
x+ 1
dx+O(ψn
1/4
),
and the integral satisfies ∫ ∞
0
e−nx
x
x+ 1
dx =
1
n2
−O
(
1
n3
)
.
Proof Notice first that
E[X≤x] =
∫ x
0
e−tt dt∫ x
0
e−t dt
=
1− (x+ 1)e−x
1− e−x .
For small x the numerator is 1 − (x + 1)(1 − x + x2/2 + O(x3)) = (3/2)x2 + O(x3) and the denominator
is x + O(x2), and so E[X≤x] ∼ (3/2)x. We conclude that x = O(E[X≤x]) for x near 0, and so Theorem 1
applies.
Using the formula for E[X≤x], we have
φ(x) :=
x
E[X≤x]
=
x(1− e−x)
1− (x+ 1)e−x .
It is easy to calculate Pr[Xnmax ≤ x] = (1 − e−x)n, and so the density of Xnmax is n(1 − e−x)n−1e−x. We
conclude that
E
x∼Xnmax
[φ(x)] = n
∫ ∞
0
(1− e−x)n x
ex − (1 + x) dx
= n
∫ 1
0
(1− t)n log 1
t
dt
1− (t+ t log 1t )
.
In order to estimate the integral, write∫ 1
0
(1− t)n log 1
t
dt
1− (t+ t log 1t )
= In + Jn +Kn,
where In, Jn,Kn are given by
In =
∫ 1
0
(1− t)n log 1
t
dt,
Jn =
∫ 1
0
(1− t)n log 1
t
(t+ t log 1t ) dt,
Kn =
∫ 1
0
(1− t)n log 1
t
(t+ t log 1t )
2 dt
1− (t+ t log 1t )
.
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Surprisingly, we can calculate In, Jn exactly in terms of the harmonic numbers Hn:
In =
Hn+1
n+ 1
=
1
n+ 1
n∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
, (2)
Jn =
1
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
n∑
i=0
2
i+ 2
Hi − i
2 − i− 4
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)2
. (3)
In order to get the formula for In, notice first that t+ t log
1
t is an antiderivative of log
1
t . This immediately
implies that I0 = 1, and for n > 0, integration by parts givs
In =
∫ 1
0
(1− t)n log 1
t
dt
= (1− t)n
(
t+ t log
1
t
)∣∣∣∣1
0
+ n
∫ 1
0
(1− t)n−1t
(
1 + log
1
t
)
dt
= n
∫ 1
0
[(1− t)n−1 − (1− t)n] log 1
t
dt+ n
∫ 1
0
(1− t)n−1t dt
= n(In−1 − In) + 1
n+ 1
,
using the formula for the Beta integral. This shows that (n + 1)In = nIn−1 + 1/(n + 1), which implies
formula (2). Formula (3) is proved along the same lines. It is well-known that Hn = log n+ γ +O(1/n), and
this shows that
In =
Hn+1
n+ 1
=
log(n+ 1) + γ +O(1/n)
n+ 1
=
log n+ γ
n
+O
(
log n
n2
)
.
Similarly, using the integral
∫ n
1
2 logm
m dm = log
2 n to estimate the corresponding series, we obtain
Jn =
1
Θ(n2)
n∑
i=0
O
(
log n
n
)
= O
(
log2 n
n2
)
.
It remains to estimate Kn. We break Kn into two parts, Ln =
∫ 1/e
0
and Mn =
∫ 1
1/e
, which we bound
separately. Since t+ t log 1t is increasing, when t ≤ 1/e we have t+ t log 1t ≤ 2/e < 1, and so
Ln =
∫ 1/e
0
(1− t)n log 1
t
(t+ t log 1t )
2 dt
1− (t+ t log 1t )
≤ 1
1− 2/eJn = O
(
log2 n
n2
)
.
When t ≥ 1/e, we have log 1t ≤ 1 and so
Mn ≤ 4
∫ 1
1/e
(1− t)n dt
1− (t+ t log 1t )
= 4
∫ 1−1/e
0
sn
ds
s+ (1− s) log(1− s) ,
where we applied the substitution s = 1− t. Taylor expansion shows that s+ (1− s) log(1− s) ≥ s2/2, and
so
Mn ≤ 8
∫ 1−1/e
0
sn−2 ds = 8
(1− 1/e)n−1
n− 1 .
We conclude that Jn +Kn = O(log
2 n/n2), and so∫ 1
0
(1− t)n log 1
t
dt
1− (t+ t log 1t )
=
log n+ γ
n
+O
(
log2 n
n2
)
.
We move on to calculate E[ϕ1(qnE[X])]. We have
E[X≥x] =
∫∞
x
e−tt dt∫∞
x
e−t dt
=
(x+ 1)e−x
e−x
= x+ 1.
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Fig. 2 Shapley values for the normalized iid model with X = Exp(1) and various n of both maximal and minimal agent,
multiplied by n and by n2, respectively, at the quota q = 1/2. Results of 106 experiments. The experimental results are
compared to the predictions of Theorem 3: the maximal Shapley value is compared against (logn + γ)/n, and the minimal
Shapley value is compared against 1/n2.
It is easy to calculate Pr[Xnmin ≥ x] = e−nx, and so the density of Xnmin is ne−nx. We conclude that
E
x∼Xnmin
[ x
E[X≥x]
]
= n
∫ ∞
0
e−nx
x
x+ 1
dx.
This gives us the stated formula. In order to estimate the integral, note that∫ ∞
0
e−nx
x
x+ 1
dx =
∫ ∞
0
e−nx dx−
∫ ∞
0
e−nx
dx
x+ 1
=
1
n
− en
∫ ∞
1
e−nx
dx
x
=
1
n
− en
∫ ∞
n
e−x
x
dx
The latter integral is an exponential integral, and its asymptotic expansion is∫ ∞
n
e−x
x
dx = e−n
(
1
n
− 1
n2
+O
(
1
n3
))
.
We conclude that ∫ ∞
0
e−nx
x
x+ 1
dx =
1
n2
−O
(
1
n3
)
.
7 Proving Theorem 1
Recall the statement of Theorem 1:
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Theorem 1 Let X be a non-negative continuous random variable whose density function f satisfies f(t) ≤
Ce−λt for some C, λ > 0, and additionally, the support of f can be partitioned into finitely many intervals
on which f is differentiable and monotone, and that x = O(EX≤x[X]) for x near χmin.
For all  > 0 there exists ξ < 1 such that the following holds. For all Q ∈ [n1/4, (1− )E[X]],
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmax
[ x
E[X≤x]
]±O(ξn1/4).
Similarly, for all Q ∈ [n1/4, (n− n2/3)E[X]],
E[ϕ[x]min(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmin
[ x
E[X≥x]
]±O(ξn1/4).
Recall that we generated the weights w1, . . . , wn according to the following process. First, we generate the
sequence x1, . . . , xn by generating n samples from the distribution X. The sequence w1, . . . , wn consists of
the values x1, . . . , xn sorted in increasing order. It will be simpler to analyze the original sequence x1, . . . , xn
and some values derived from it:
– xmax = max(x1, . . . , xn), the corresponding distribution is X
n
max, and the corresponding Shapley value
(with respect to x1, . . . , xn) is ϕ
[x]
max.
– xmin = min(x1, . . . , xn), the corresponding distribution is X
n
min, and the corresponding Shapley value
(with respect to x1, . . . , xn) is ϕ
[x]
min.
Recall also that we defined
χmin = inf{x : Pr[X ≥ x] > 0}, χmax = sup{x : Pr[X ≤ x] > 0}.
The crux of the proof is the following formula for the Shapley values of the original sequence x1, . . . , xn.
Lemma 1 For any quota value Q,
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] = E
x∼Xnmax
 1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yn−1∼X≤x
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
 , (4)
E[ϕ[x]min(Q)] = E
x∼Xnmin
 1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yn−1∼X≥x
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
 . (5)
Proof The proofs of both formulas are similar, so we only prove the first one. We show that conditioned on
xmax = x,
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] =
1
n
Pr
y1,...,yn−1∼X≤x
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
 .
We can assume without loss of generality that xmax = xn. Given only this data, the variables x1, . . . , xn−1
are distributed independently according to X≤xn . Therefore
E[ϕ[x]n (Q)] = E
pi∈Sn
[xn is pivotal in xpi1 , . . . , xpin ]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
pi∈Sn :
pii=n
Pr[xn is pivotal in xpi1 , . . . , xpin ]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
pi∈Sn :
pii=n
Pr
i−1∑
j=1
xpij ∈ [Q− x,Q)
 .
Here pivotal is always with respect to the threshold Q. Since x1, . . . , xn−1 are independent and identically
distributed, xpi1 , . . . , xpii−1 are distributed identically to y1, . . . , yi−1, proving (4). Formula (5) is proved along
similar lines.
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7.1 Estimating the formulas
Recall that our main approach is to use an analogy to renewal processes, in which each of the agent weights
can be thought of as a renewal ‘step’ and that furthermore, estimating the expected number of points that
land within the interval [q −wn, q) will be used for proving the formulas for the highest Shapley value (and
similarly for the lowest Shapley value).
The first step towards achieving this goal is to extend the sums in Lemma 1 to infinite sums. Estimating
these infinite sums will be done using the following lemma, which is relevant to renewal processes with
exponentially decaying renewal time distributions.
Proposition 1 Suppose Y is a continuous distribution supported on [0,∞) whose density function f(t) is
bounded by Ce−λt for some C, λ > 0. Furthermore, suppose that Y is I-piecewise differentiable-monotone:
the support of Y can be partitioned into I many intervals, on each of which f is differentiable and monotone
(non-increasing or non-decreasing). There exist constants B, γ > 0, depending only on C, λ, I, such that for
Q ≥ 0,
∞∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yi−1∼Y
i−1∑
j=1
yj < Q
 = Q
EY
+
E(Y 2)
2(EY )2
+ , where || ≤ Be−γQ.
We conjecture that Proposition 1 can be strengthened by removing the condition that f is piecewise
differentiable-monotone. This condition is only used in one place in the proof, Lemma 11.
This form of the renewal theorem differs from others in the literature in that the error term is uniform
over all distributions with given decay. We prove Proposition 1 in Section 9.
In order to utilize this proposition for the estimation the sums in Lemma 1, we need to restrict the value
of x in X≥x and X≤x. For m ∈ (χmin, χmax), we say that Y is an m-reasonable random variable if either
Y = X≥x for x ≤ m or Y = X≤x for x ≥ m. These variables enjoy the following properties.
Lemma 2 Let m ∈ (χmin, χmax), and define µ = min(Pr[X ≤ m],Pr[X ≥ m]) > 0. Then the density g of
every m-reasonable random variable Y satisfies g(t) ≤ Cµ e−λt, and E[Y ] ≤ Cµλ · 1λ , E[Y 2] ≤ Cµλ · 2λ2 . Also,
Pr[Y ≥ t] ≤ Cλµe−λt.
Proof When Y = X≥x, we have g(t) = 0 for t < x and g(t) = f(t)/Pr[X ≥ x] ≤ f(t)/µ ≤ (C/µ)e−λt. A
similar calculation shows that g(t) ≤ (C/µ)e−λt when Y = X≤x. The bound on the density, in turn, implies
the bound on the moments, using the formulas E[Exp(λ)] = 1/λ, E[Exp(λ)2] = 2/λ2:
E[Y ] =
∫ ∞
0
g(t)t dt ≤ C
λµ
∫ ∞
0
λe−λtt dt =
C
λµ
· 1
λ
.
The bound on E[Y 2] is obtained similarly. The bound on Pr[Y ≥ t] is obtained using a similar calculation
applied to Pr[Exp(λ) ≥ t] = e−λt.
We can now apply Proposition 1.
Corollary 2 Let Y be an m-reasonable random variable, for some m ∈ (χmin, χmax). Then for some γ < 1
depending only on m and for all Q ≥ 0,
∞∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yi−1∼Y
i−1∑
j=1
yj < Q
 = Q
EY
+
E(Y 2)
2(EY )2
±O(γQ).
In particular, for all x ≥ 0 and Q ≥ x,
∞∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yi−1∼Y
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
 = x
EY
±O(γQ−x).
Proof The first statement of the corollary follows directly from Proposition 1, given Lemma 2; note that any
m-reasonable variable is I-piecewise differentiable-monotone. The second statement follows by applying the
first statement to Q and to Q− x, and subtracting the two estimates.
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The corollary affords us with a good estimate of the sums in Lemma 1, when extended from n to ∞. In
order to estimate the actual sums, we estimate the tail from n+ 1 to ∞.
Lemma 3 Let Y be an m-reasonable random variable, for some m ∈ (χmin, χmax). For some δ < 1 depending
only on m and for all Q ≤ (n− n2/3)EY ,
∞∑
i=n+1
Pr
y1,...,yi−1∼Y
i−1∑
j=1
yj < Q
 = O(δn1/4),
where the constant in O(·) depends only on m.
Proof The idea of the proof is to apply Bernstein’s inequality to show that it is highly improbable that the
sum of n variables (or more) distributed according to Y be significantly smaller than nE[Y ]. One complication
is that Bernstein’s inequality only applies to bounded random variables, whereas Y could be unbounded. In
order to fix this, we choose a cut-off M and consider the random variable Z = min(Y,M) instead. Note that
E[Y ]− E[Z] =
∫ ∞
M
g(t)(t−M) dt ≤ C
λµ
∫ ∞
M
λe−λt(t−M) dt
=
C
λµ
λe−λM
∫ ∞
0
λe−λtt dt =
C
λ2µ
e−λM = O(e−λM ).
Therefore, if we choose M = K log n for some constant K depending only on X and m then we can ensure
that E[Y ]− E[Z] ≤ (1/(2n1/3))E[X≤m] and so E[Y ]− E[Z] ≤ (1/(2n1/3))E[Y ].
For the rest of this proof, let y1, y2, . . . ∼ Y be independent copies of Y , and let z1, z2, . . . ∼ Z be
independent copies of Z. Bernstein’s inequality implies that when Q ≤ (n+ k)E[Z] (which always holds, as
we show below),
Pr
n+k∑
j=1
yj < Q
 ≤ Pr
n+k∑
j=1
zj < Q

≤ exp− ((n+ k)E[Z]−Q)
2/2
(n+ k)V[Z] + ((n+ k)E[Z]−Q)(M/3)
≤ exp− ((n+ k)E[Z]−Q)
2/2
(n+ k)(V[Z] + (M/3)E[Z])
≤ exp− ((n+ k)E[Z]−Q)
2
(n+ k)(3M2)
.
Note that
nE[Z]−Q ≥
(
n− n
2/3
2
)
E[Y ]−Q ≥ 1
2
n2/3 E[Y ],
and therefore, using E[Z] ≥ E[Y ]/2,
((n+ k)E[Z]−Q)2 ≥ (kE[Z] + 12n2/3 E[Y ])2 ≥ 14 E[Y ]2(k + n2/3)2.
When k ≤ n, we have
exp− ((n+ k)E[Z]−Q)
2
(n+ k)(3M2)
≤ exp−
1
4 E[Y ]
2n4/3
(2n)(3M2)
= exp−E[Y ]
2n1/3
24M2
.
When k ≥ n, we have
exp− ((n+ k)E[Z]−Q)
2
(n+ k)(3M2)
≤ exp−
1
4 E[Y ]
2k2
(2k)(3M2)
= exp−E[Y ]
2k
24M2
.
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Therefore
∞∑
k=0
Pr
n+k∑
j=1
yj < Q
 ≤ n exp−E[Y ]2n1/3
24M2
+
∞∑
k=n
exp−E[Y ]
2k
24M2
≤ n exp−E[Y ]
2n1/3
24M2
+
exp−E[Y ]2n24M2
1− exp− E[Y ]224M2
.
Since E[Y ] ≥ E[X≤m] and M = O(log n), we can conclude that
∞∑
k=0
Pr
n+k∑
j=1
yj < Q
 ≤ ne−Ω( n1/3log2 n) +O(log2 ne−Ω( nlog2 n)) ,
implying the lemma.
Combining this with Corollary 2, we obtain the following estimate.
Corollary 3 Let Y be an m-reasonable random variable, for some m ∈ (χmin, χmax). Then for some ζ < 1
depending only on m, for all x ≥ 0 and for all Q ∈ [x, (n− n2/3)E[Y ]],
n∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yn−1∼Y
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
 = x
E[Y ]
±O(ζn1/4 + ζQ−x).
Proof Clearly
∞∑
i=n+1
Pr
y1,...,yi−1∼Y
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
 ≤ ∞∑
i=n+1
Pr
y1,...,yi−1∼Y
i−1∑
j=1
yj < Q
 = O(δn1/4),
using Lemma 3. Therefore Corollary 2 implies that
n∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yn−1∼Y
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
 = x
E[Y ]
±O(δn1/4 + γQ−x).
The corollary follows by taking ζ = max(δ, γ).
Using this estimate, we can estimate the sums in Lemma 1. The idea is to focus on the case in which the
variable X≤x or X≥x is m-reasonable.
Lemma 4 Let m ∈ (χmin, χmax). For some ξ < 1 depending on m and for all Q ∈ [n1/4, (n−n2/3)E[X≤m]],
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m
[ x
E[X≤x]
]±O(ξn1/4).
Similarly, for all Q ∈ [n1/4, (n− n2/3)E[X]],
E[ϕ[x]min(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmin
[ x
E[X≥x]
]±O(ξn1/4).
Proof We start with the first formula. Let µ≤ = Pr[X ≤ m] and µ≥ = Pr[X ≥ m] = 1 − µ≤. Clearly
Pr[Xnmax ≤ m] = µn≤. Using Lemma 1, we get for any M > m that
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] = E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m,≤M
[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yn−1∼X≤x
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
]±O(µn≤ + Pr[Xnmax > M ]]).
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Corollary 3 implies that for all Q ∈ [M, (n− n2/3)E[X≤m]],
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m,≤M
[ x
E[X≤x]
]±O(ζn1/4 + ζQ−M + µn≤ + Pr[Xnmax > M ]).
(We need the restriction x ≤ M so that we can bound the term ζQ−M .) We proceed to estimate the main
term, aiming to remove the restriction x ≤ M . Define φ(x) = x/E[X≤x], and note that φ(x) ≤ x/E[X≤m]
when x ≥ m. We have
E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m
[φ(x)] = Pr[(Xnmax)≥m > M ] E
x∼(Xnmax)>M
[φ(x)]
+ (1− Pr[(Xnmax)≥m > M ]) E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m,≤M
[φ(x)].
Note that Pr[(Xnmax)≥m > M ] is at most the probability that the maximum of n variables distributed X≥m
is more than M . Lemma 2 and a union bound show that this probability is at most n CλµPr[X≥m]e
−λM =
O(ne−λM ). Together with φ(x) ≤M/E[X≤m] whenever m ≤ x ≤M , this shows that
E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m
[φ(x)] = E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m,≤M
[φ(x)] + Pr[(Xnmax)≥m > M ] E
x∼(Xnmax)>M
[φ(x)]−O(nMe−λM ).
Suppose that for some integer K > 0, M ≥ Kλ−1 log n. Lemma 2 shows that Pr[X > t] ≤ Cλµe−λt, and so
Pr[(Xnmax)≥m > M ] E
x∼(Xnmax)>M
[φ(x)]
≤ 1
E[X≤m]
Pr[(Xnmax)≥m > M ] E
x∼(Xnmax)>M
[x]
≤ 1
E[X≤m]
Pr[(Xnmax)≥m > Kλ
−1 log n] E
x∼(Xnmax)>Kλ−1 logn
[x]
≤ 1
E[X≤m]
∞∑
r=K
λ−1(r + 1) log nPr[λ−1r log n ≤ Xnmax ≤ λ−1(r + 1) log n]
≤ C
λµE[X≤m]
∞∑
r=K
λ−1(r + 1) log ne−r logn
=
O(C)
λµE[X≤m]
λ−1 log n
K
nK
.
If M ≥ 2λ−1 log n then we can choose K = bλM/ log nc ≥ λM/(2 log n) and so nK ≥ e(λ/2)M and K/nK ≤
λMe−(λ/2)M . Therefore
E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m
[φ(x)] = E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m,≤M
[φ(x)]±O(nMe−(λ/2)M ).
Lemma 2 and a union bound show that Pr[Xnmax > M ] = O(ne
−λM ), and we deduce that for M ≥ 2λ−1 log n,
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m,≤M
[ x
E[X≤x]
]±O(ζn1/4 + ζQ−M + µn≤ + ne−λM )
=
1
n
E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m
[ x
E[X≤x]
]±O(ζn1/4 + ζQ−M + µn≤ +Me−(λ/2)M ).
Choosing M = Q/2, we deduce that
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m
[ x
E[X≤x]
]±O(ζn1/4 + ζQ/2 + µn≤ + log ne−(λ/4)Q).
This implies the formula in the statement of the lemma, with ξ > max(
√
ζ, e−λ/4, µ≤, µ≥) (we need µ≥ for
the other part of the lemma).
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We continue with the second formula. As before, we have
E[ϕ[x]min(Q)] = E
x∼(Xnmin)≤m
[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yn−1∼X≥x
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
]±O(µn≥).
Corollary 3 implies that for all Q ∈ [m, (n− n2/3)E[X]],
ϕ
[x]
min(Q) =
1
n
E
x∼(Xnmin)≤m
[ x
E[X≥x]
]±O(ζn1/4 + ζQ + µn≥). (6)
Now, as by definition Pr[Xnmin ≥ m] = µn≥, we have that
E
x∼Xnmin
[ x
E[X≥x]
]
= µn≥ · E
x∼(Xnmin)≥m
[ x
E[X≥x]
]
+ (1− µn≥) · E
x∼(Xnmin)≤m
[ x
E[X≥x]
]
= E
x∼(Xnmin)≤m
x
E[X≥x]
+ µn≥ ·
(
E
x∼(Xnmin)≥m
[ x
E[X≥x]
]− E
x∼(Xnmin)≤m
[ x
E[X≥x]
])
= E
x∼(Xnmin)≤m
x
E[X≥x]
+O(µn≥), (7)
where the last line follows from the fact that xEX≥x ≤ 1. Combining this with (6) gives the second formula
in the statement of the lemma.
We can now prove out main result.
Theorem 1 Let X be a non-negative continuous random variable whose density function f satisfies f(t) ≤
Ce−λt for some C, λ > 0, and additionally, the support of f can be partitioned into finitely many intervals
on which f is differentiable and monotone, and that x = O(EX≤x[X]) for x near χmin.
For all  > 0 there exists ξ < 1 such that the following holds. For all Q ∈ [n1/4, (1− )E[X]],
E[ϕ[x]max(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmax
[ x
E[X≤x]
]±O(ξn1/4).
Similarly, for all Q ∈ [n1/4, (n− n2/3)E[X]],
E[ϕ[x]min(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmin
[ x
E[X≥x]
]±O(ξn1/4).
Proof The formula for E[ϕ[x]min(Q)] is already stated in Lemma 4, so we only prove the formula for E[ϕ
[x]
max(Q)].
Given  > 0, we choose m large enough so that E[X≤m] > (1 − )E[X]. For large enough n, the condition
Q ≤ (1− )nE[X] implies the condition Q ≤ (n− n2/3)E[X].
Since x = O(E[X≤x]) for x near χmin, the expectation Ex∼(Xnmax)≤m [
x
E[X≤x] ] converges. Therefore we
similarly have
E
x∼Xnmax
[ x
E[X≤x]
]
= µn≤ · E
x∼(Xnmax)≤m
[ x
E[X≤x]
]
+ (1− µn≤) · E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m
[ x
E[X≤x]
]
= E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m
x
E[X≤x]
+ µn≥ ·
(
E
x∼(Xnmax)≤m
[ x
E[X≤x]
]− E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m
[ x
E[X≤x]
])
= E
x∼(Xnmax)≥m
x
E[X≤x]
+O(µn≤), (8)
implying the formula for E[ϕ[x]max(Q)].
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8 Conjuctural extensions
8.1 Normalized iid model
Theorem 1 predicts the values of the minimal and maximal Shapley values in the natural iid model. We
conjecture that a similar theorem holds for the normalized iid model.
Conjecture 1 Let X be a non-negative continuous random variable whose density function f satisfies f(t) ≤
Ce−λt for some C, λ > 0, and additionally, the support of f can be partitioned into finitely many intervals on
which f is differentiable and monotone. Furthermore, for the first statement, assume also that x = O(E[X≤x])
for x near χmin, where χmin = inf{x : Pr[X ≥ x] > 0}.
Generate weights w1, . . . , wn according to the normalized iid model: generate n i.i.d. samples x1, . . . , xn
of X, let S = x1 + · · · + xn, and let w1, . . . , wn consist of the values x1/S, . . . , xn/S sorted in increasing
order.
For all  > 0 there exist ψ < 1 and K > 0 such that:
– For all q ∈ [Kn−3/4, 1− ],
E[ϕn(q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmax
[
x
E[X≤x]
]±O(ψn1/4).
– For all q ∈ [Kn−3/4, 1−Kn−1/3],
E[ϕ1(q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnmin
[
x
E[X≥x]
]±O(ψn1/4).
This implies the following corollary, whose proof is very similar to the proof of Corollary 1.
Conjecture 2 Let X be a random variable satisfying the requirements of Theorem 1. Suppose that q ∈ (0, 1)
and (for the first statement) χmax <∞, where χmax = sup{x : Pr[X ≤ x] > 0}. Then
lim
n→∞nE[ϕn(q)] =
χmax
E[X]
,
lim
n→∞nE[ϕ1(q)] =
χmin
E[X]
.
If χmax =∞ then as n→∞ we have nE[ϕn(q)]→∞ and
nE[ϕn(q)] ∼ E
x∼Xnmax
[
x
E[X≤x]
].
These conjectures are supported by our experiments for the uniform and exponential distributions, ap-
pearing in Figure 1 (uniform distribution) and Figure 2 (exponential distribution). While these experiments
were performed using the normalized iid model, their results match those of the natural iid model.
Theorem 1 gives a strong estimate for E[ϕn(Q)] and E[ϕ1(Q)]. In terms of the natural iid model, Con-
jecture 1 predicts a strong estimate for the quantities E[ϕn(q
∑n
i=1 xi)] and E[ϕ1(q
∑n
i=1 xi)]. Since
∑n
i=1 xi
is strongly concentrated around nE[X], and E[ϕi(Q)] is concentrated around some limiting value Φi (for
i = 1, n) for Q ≈ qnE[X], we expect E[ϕi(q
∑n
i=1 xi)] ≈ Φi. In order to show this, it suffices to prove that
for S ≈ nE[X] and Q ≈ qnE[X], we have E[ϕi(Q)|
∑n
i=1 xi = S] ≈ Φi. Unfortunately, at the moment we
cannot prove this estimate.
8.2 Other Shapley values
Theorem 1 and Conjecture 1 describe the behavior of the Shapley values corresponding to the minimal
and maximal agents. It is natural to ask how the Shapley values in between behave. Based on the proof of
Theorem 1, we can formulate a conjecture for the behavior of the non-extreme Shapley values. Since the
formulation is cleaner in the normalized iid model, we present it in that model. For p ∈ (0, 1), let ϕpn(q) be
the Shapley value corresponding to the pnth order statistics, let Xnpn be the distribution of the pnth order
statistics (in both cases rounding pn arbitrarily to an integer), and let Xp≶x be the random variable which
is a mixture of X≤x (with probability p) and X≥x (with probability 1− p).
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Fig. 3 All Shapley values for X = U(0, 1) and X = Exp(1) (both in the normalized iid model) and the setting n = 100 at
the quota q = 1/2, normalized by n. Results of 106 experiments. The experimental results are compared to the predictions of
Corollary 4: ϕpn(q) = 2p for X = U(0, 1) and ϕpn(q) = − log(1− p) for X = Exp(1).
Conjecture 3 Let X be a random variable satisfying the requirements of Theorem 1. For all p ∈ (0, 1) there
exist ψ < 1 and K > 0 such that for all q ∈ [Kn−3/4, 1−Kn1/3],
E[ϕpn(q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xnpn
[
x
E[Xp≶x]
]± o
(
1
n
)
.
This conjecture determines the limiting value of nE[ϕpn(q)]:
Corollary 4 Suppose that p, q ∈ (0, 1). Then
lim
n→∞nE[ϕpn(q)] =
x
E[X]
, where Pr[X ≤ x] = p.
Proof As n→∞, the distribution of Xnpn tends to the constant x. At that point, we have
E[Xp≶x] = pE[X≤x] + (1− p)E[X≥x]
= Pr[X ≤ x]E[X≤x] + Pr[X ≥ x]E[X≥x]
= E[X].
As an illustration, we apply Corollary 4 to the uniform distribution U(a, b) and to the exponential
distribution Exp(1). When X = U(a, b), we have E[X] = a+b2 and Pr[X ≤ x] = x−ab−a , and so Pr[X ≤ x] = p
for x = (1 − p)a + pb. Therefore Corollary 4 implies that nE[ϕpn(q)] → 2(1−p)a+2pba+b for all q ∈ (0, 1). In
particular, when X = U(0, 1) the corollary implies that nE[ϕpn(q)]→ 2p for all q ∈ (0, 1).
When X = Exp(1), we have E[X] = 1 and Pr[X ≤ x] = 1−e−x, and so Pr[X ≤ x] = p for x = − log(1−p).
Therefore Corollary 4 implies that nE[ϕpn(q)]→ − log(1− p) for all q ∈ (0, 1).
Corresponding experimental results shown in Figure 3 support Corollary 4 and so Conjecture 3.
In the remainder of this section, we briefly described how Conjecture 3 follows by extending the ideas of
Section 7.
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A straightforward generalization of Lemma 1 shows that
E[ϕ[x]p(n−1)(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xn
p(n−1)
 n∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yn−1
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
 , (9)
where y1, . . . , yn−1 are chosen as follows: a random subset of p(n− 1) of them are chosen according to X≤x,
and the rest are chosen according to X≥x. A generalization of Corollary 3 shows that if we choose some
m1,m2 satisfying χmin < m1 < m2 < χmax, then for all x ∈ [m1,m2] we have
n∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yn−1∼Xp≶x
i−1∑
j=1
yj ∈ [Q− x,Q)
 = x
E[Xp≶x]
±O(ζn1/4 + ζQ−x). (10)
The expressions in (9) and (10) are very similar, the difference being that in (9) the number of positions
distributed according to X≤x is exactly p(n− 1), while in (10) it is strongly concentrated around p(n− 1).
It is therefore reasonable to conjecture that the analog of Lemma 4 holds,
E[ϕ[x]p(n−1)(Q)] =
1
n
E
x∼Xn
p(n−1)
[
x
E[Xp≶x]
] + o
(
1
n
)
.
Given this, Conjecture 3 (in its version for the natural iid model) follows just as in the proof of Theorem 1.
9 Proving Proposition 1
In this section, we complete the proof of Theorem 1 by proving Proposition 1.
The idea of the proof is to use the Mellin transform to write
m(Q) ,
∞∑
i=1
Pr
y1,...,yi−1∼Y
i−1∑
j=1
yj < Q
 = 1
2pii
∫ c+i∞
c−i∞
esQ
s(1− E[e−sY ]) ds,
where c > 0 is arbitrary. The integrand has a double pole at s = 0 with residue Q/EY + E(Y 2)/2(EY )2,
which gives rise to the main term in the proposition. The conditions on the distribution Y imply that apart
from the pole at s = 0, the integrand has no poles in some halfspace <s ≥ −γ. Therefore we can move
the line of integration to the left toward −γ, and then read off the error term. The exponential dependence
comes from the numerator esQ.
In the rest of this section, we will assume that Y is a continuous distribution supported on [0,∞) whose
density function f is bounded by Ce−λt for some C, λ > 0. Whenever we use the term “constant”, we mean
a quantity depending only on the parameters C, λ, I.
We start by proving the formula for m(Q).
Lemma 5 For all c > 0,
m(Q) =
1
2pii
∫ c+i∞
c−i∞
esQ
s(1− E[e−sY ]) ds.
Proof It is well-known that
1
2pii
∫ c+i∞
c−i∞
esx
s
ds =
{
1 x > 0,
0 x < 0.
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Therefore, letting (yk)
∞
1 ∼ Y ,
m(Q) =
∞∑
k=1
Pr
y1,...,yk−1∼Y
k−1∑
j=1
yj < Q

=
∞∑
k=1
E[1Q−y1+···+yk−1>0]
=
∞∑
k=1
E
y1,...,yk−1∼Y
1
2pii
∫ c+i∞
c−i∞
es(Q−y1−···−yk−1)
s
ds
=
∞∑
k=1
1
2pii
∫ c+i∞
c−i∞
esQ
s
E[e−sy1−···−syk−1 ] ds
=
∞∑
k=1
1
2pii
∫ c+i∞
c−i∞
esQ
s
E[e−sY ]k−1 ds
=
1
2pii
∫ c+i∞
c−i∞
esQ
s(1− E[e−sY ]) ds.
The following elementary bounds will prove useful.
Lemma 6 For each integer k ≥ 0,
E[Y k] ≤ C
λ
k!
λk
.
For each x < y,
Pr[x ≤ Y ≤ y] ≤ C
λ
(e−λx − e−λy).
Proof When f(u) = λe−λu, Y is an exponential random variable with moments E[Y k] = k!/λk, and so in
general
E[Y k] ≤ C
λ
∫ ∞
0
λe−λuuk du =
C
λ
k!
λk
.
The second bound follows by calculating C
∫ y
x
e−λu du.
We proceed to show that in some halfspace <s ≥ −γ, the integrand has no poles other than the double pole
at s = 0. In fact, we will show more: in this halfspace, excepting a fixed neighborhood of zero, |1−E[e−sY ]| =
Ω(1).
Lemma 7 For every I > 0 there are constants η,R > 0 such that
<E[e−sY ] ≤ 1− η
whenever <s ≥ −R and |=s| ≥ I.
Proof Let s = −α+ iβ, where α ≤ R (a constant to be determined) and |β| ≥ I. We have
<E[e−sY ] =
∫ ∞
0
f(u)eαu cos(βu) du
=
∫ ∞
0
f(u)(cos(βu)(eαu − 1) + cos(βu)) du
≤
∫ ∞
0
f(u)(eαu − 1) du+
∫ ∞
0
f(u) cos(βu) du
=
∫ ∞
0
f(u)eαu du−
∫ ∞
0
f(u)(1− cos(βu)) du.
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Denote the two terms by A,B, so that <E[e−sY ] = A− B. We will show that B ≥ 2η for some η > 0, and
that for R ≤ λ/2,
A ≤ 1 + 2CR
λ2
.
Taking R > 0 small enough, we can ensure that A−B ≤ 1− η.
We start with the bound on A. If α ≤ 0 then
A =
∫ ∞
0
f(u)eαu du ≤
∫ ∞
0
f(u) du = 1.
If 0 < α ≤ R for some R ≤ λ/2 then
A = E[eαY ] = 1 +
∞∑
k=1
αk
k!
E[Y k]
≤ 1 + C
λ
∞∑
k=1
(α
λ
)k
≤ 1 + C
λ
∞∑
k=1
(
R
λ
)k
= 1 +
C
λ
· R
λ
· 2,
using Lemma 6, proving the bound on A.
The bound on B is slightly more complicated. For small  > 0, we have 1 − cos(βu) <  only if βu ∈
2piZ+ [−K√,K√], where K is some universal constant. Therefore
B =
∫ ∞
0
f(u)(1− cos(βu)) du ≥ Pr[βY /∈ 2piZ+ [−K√,K√]].
Suppose without loss of generality that β > 0. For  < 1/K2,
Pr[βY ∈ 2piZ+ [−K√,K√]]
= Pr[Y ≤ K√/β] +
∞∑
t=1
Pr[|Y − (2pi/β)t| ≤ K√/β]
≤ C
λ
(1− e−(Kλ/β)
√
) +
C
λ
(e(Kλ/β)
√
 − e−(Kλ/β)
√
)
∞∑
t=1
e−(2piλ/β)t
=
C
λ
(1− e−(Kλ/β)
√
) +
C
λ
(e(Kλ/β)
√
 − e−(Kλ/β)
√
)
e−(2piλ/β)
1− e−(2piλ/β) ,
using Lemma 6. The bound is monotone decreasing in β, and so since β ≥ I, we can bound the probability
by O(
√
), where the hidden constant depends on C, λ, I. This shows that B ≥ (1−O(√)). In particular,
we can choose a small  > 0 such that B ≥ /2, proving the bound on B.
The constant I arises from the following lemma (we later choose I = S/
√
2).
Lemma 8 There exist constants S, δ > 0 such that for all |s| ≤ S,
|E[e−sY ]− 1| ≥ δ|s|.
Proof For any τ ≥ 0, using f(u) ≤ C we get
E[Y ] ≥ τ Pr[Y ≥ τ ] = τ(1− Pr[Y ≤ τ ]) ≥ τ(1− Cτ).
In particular, choosing τ = 1/(2C), we deduce E[Y ] ≥ 1/(4C).
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Consider now any complex s. We have
E[e−sY ] = 1− E[Y ]s+
∞∑
k=2
(−1)kE[Y
k]
k!
sk.
Using Lemma 6, we deduce that for |s| ≤ λ/2,
|E[e−sY ]− 1| ≥ E[Y ]|s| −
∞∑
k=2
( |s|
λ
)k
≥ |s|
4C
− 2|s|
2
λ2
= |s|
(
1
4C
− 2|s|
λ2
)
.
If we choose S = min(λ/2, λ2/(16C)) then we deduce that |E[e−sY ]− 1| ≥ |s|/(8C).
Combining the two lemmas, we obtain the following information on E[e−sY ].
Lemma 9 There are constants , γ, I > 0 such that E[e−sY ] 6= 1 whenever <s ≥ −γ and s 6= 0, and
furthermore
|E[e−sY ]− 1| ≥ min(|s|, 1)
whenever |<s| ≤ γ.
Proof Let S, δ be the constants in Lemma 8, let I = S/
√
2, and let R, η be the constants in Lemma 7.
Define γ = min(R, I). Suppose that <s ≥ −γ and s 6= 0. If |=s| ≥ I then <E[e−sY ] ≤ 1 − η, and in
particular E[e−sY ] 6= 1. If |=s| ≤ I then |s| ≤
√
γ2 + I2 ≤ S, and so |E[e−sY ] − 1| ≥ δ|s|, again showing
that E[e−sY ] 6= 1. This proves the first claim.
For the second claim, suppose that |<s| ≤ γ. If |=s| ≥ I then |E[e−sY ] − 1| ≥ |<E[e−sY ] − 1| ≥ η. If
|=s| ≤ I then as before |s| ≤ S and so |E[e−sY ]− 1| ≥ δ|s|. Taking  = min(η, δ) proves the second claim.
Next, we move the line of integration to the left in order to separate the main termQ/EY+E(Y 2)/2(EY )2
from the error term.
Lemma 10 For all Q > 0 and all 0 < β < γ, where γ > 0 is the constant from Lemma 9,
m(Q) =
Q
EY
+
E(Y 2)
(EY )2
+
1
2pii
∫ −β+i∞
−β−i∞
esQ E[e−sY ]
s(1− E[e−sY ]) ds.
Proof Our starting point is the formula of Lemma 5, for c = β. Lemma 9 shows that the only pole of the
integrand in the strip |s| ≤ β is at s = 0. Standard arguments (using the bound |E[e−sY ]− 1| ≥  given by
Lemma 9) show that
m(Q) =
1
2pii
∫ −β+i∞
−β−i∞
esQ
s(1− E[e−sY ]) ds+ Res
[
esQ
s(1− E[e−sY ]) , s = 0
]
=
1
2pii
∫ −β+i∞
−β−i∞
esQ E[e−sY ]
s(1− E[e−sY ]) ds+ Res
[
esQ
s(1− E[e−sY ]) , s = 0
]
;
the two integrals differ by the quantity ∫ −β+i∞
−β−i∞
esQ
s
ds = 0.
In order to compute the residue, write
esQ
s(1− E[e−sY ]) =
1 + sQ+O(s2)
s2(EY − 12 E(Y 2)s+O(s2))
=
(1 + sQ+O(s2))
(
1 + E(Y
2)
2EY s+O(s
2)
)
s2 EY
.
Calculating the coefficient of s−1 in this expression completes the proof.
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In order to estimate the error term, we need to understand the behavior of E[e−sY ] as |s| → ∞.
Lemma 11 Suppose α = −<s satisfies 0 < α ≤ λ/2. Then for some constant Kα depending on α,
|E[e−sY ]| ≤ Kα√|s| .
Note that this lemma is the only place in the proof in which we use the condition of piecewise differentiability-
monotonicity.
Proof Let M = log(|s|/α)4/λ ≥ 0. We will bound separately the two terms
L =
∫ M
0
e−suf(u) du, U =
∫ ∞
M
e−suf(u) du.
We start with L. Integration by parts gives
∫ M
0
e−suf(u) du = −f(u)e
−su
s
∣∣∣∣M
0
+
∫ M
0
f ′(u)
e−su
s
du.
Therefore
|L| ≤ C 1 + e
(λ/2)M
|s| +
e(λ/2)M
|s|
∫ M
0
|f ′(u)| du.
We can divide [0,M ] into N ≤ I many intervals of monotonicity, say I1 = (a1, b1), . . . , IN = (an, bn), and
bound ∫ M
0
|f ′(u)| du =
N∑
i=1
|f(bi)− f(ai)| ≤ NC.
We conclude that
|L| ≤ C 1 + (I + 1)e
(λ/2)M
|s| ≤ 3CI
e(λ/2)M
|s| ≤
3CI√
α|s| .
We proceed to bound U :
|U | ≤ C
∫ ∞
M
e(α−λ)u du ≤ C
∫ ∞
M
e−(λ/2)u du
=
C
λ/2
e−(λ/2)M =
C
√
α
(λ/2)
√|s| .
Altogether, we deduce
|E[e−sY ]| ≤ |L|+ |U | ≤
(
3CI√
α
+
2C
√
α
λ
)
1√|s| .
Finally, we estimate the error term.
Lemma 12 Let β = min(γ, λ/2) > 0, where γ > 0 is the constant from Lemma 9. We have∣∣∣∣∣
∫ −β+i∞
−β−i∞
esQ E[e−sY ]
s(1− E[e−sY ]) ds
∣∣∣∣∣ = O(e−βQ).
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Proof The triangle inequality shows that∣∣∣∣∣
∫ −β+i∞
−β−i∞
esQ E[e−sY ]
s(1− E[e−sY ]) ds
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ e−γQ
∫ −β+i∞
−β−i∞
∣∣∣∣ E[e−sY ]s(1− E[e−sY ])
∣∣∣∣ ds.
Using Lemma 11 and Lemma 9, we can estimate the integrand:∣∣∣∣ E[e−sY ]s(1− E[e−sY ])
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Kβ(min(1, β))−1 1|s|3/2 .
This estimate shows that the integral converges:∫ ∞
−∞
1√
β2 + y2
3/2
dy ≤ 2
∫ ∞
0
√
2
3/2
(β + y)3/2
dy =
4
√
2
3/2
√
β
.
The lemma follows.
Proposition 1 (with γ := β) follows by combining Lemma 10 and Lemma 12.
10 Conclusions
In this paper we tackled the problem of estimating the smallest and largest Shapley values ϕ1, ϕn in the
case in which agent weights are drawn i.i.d. according to a continuous distribution decaying exponentially.
We gave a simple formula for the limiting values nϕ1, nϕn for all relevant quota values, and gave a more
accurate formula for ϕ1, ϕn with an exponentially decaying error term.
Our results leave open several natural questions, besides resolving Conjecture 1 and Conjecture 3, and
strengthening Proposition 1 (see page 12 for the latter). First, our results do not cover values of the quota
which are very close to 0 or to nE[X] (where X is the distribution used to sample agent weights). Can we
say anything about the behavior of the Shapley values in this regime? Second, our results only concern the
expected Shapley values. Can we say anything about the actual distribution of the Shapley values, say by
bounding the variance? Third, our results concern Shapley values. Can we extend the analysis to Banzhaf
values?
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